

## Message Text

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64

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NEA-06 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 DODE-00 L-02 PRS-01 IO-03

OIC-01 CU-03 MBFR-02 SAJ-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-03

ACDA-10 AEC-05 AGR-03 RSR-01 /091 W

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R 011240Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7203

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T BONN 12589

LIMDIS

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR AUGUST 31, FOREIGN  
MINISTER SCHEEL WAS OPTIMISTIC ON THE PROSPECTS FOR THE US-  
EUROPEAN DIALOGUE AND ALSO FOR THE FRG'S RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE.

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AT THE SAME TIME SCHEEL CLEARLY FELT THAT FRANCE IS THE MAIN

OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE DIALOGUE AND TO THE GERMAN WISH FOR SPEEDIER MOVEMENT TOWARD A UNITED EUROPE. THE OVERALL EFFECT WAS THAT SCHEEL'S OPTIMISM SEEMED SOMEWHAT LABORED, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY HIS SUBORDINATE, STATE SECRETARY FRANK (REPORTED SEPTEL). END SUMMARY

1. IN THE COURSE OF MEETING AUGUST 31 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WE HAD RECENTLY HAD FROM POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL AN EXPRESSION OF GERMAN VIEWS (BONN 12254) ON THE EUROPEAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE US-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE, AND ASKED SCHEEL FOR HIS OWN APPRAISAL OF THE PROSPECTS. TO MENTION A SPECIFIC POINT, WOULD FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT GO TO COPENHAGEN FOR THE SEPTEMBER 10 MEETINGS?

2. SCHEEL SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A BETTER CHANCE OF JOBERT'S GOING THAN NOT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FRG WAS WORKING HARD (SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT TOO HARD) FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME TO THE US-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROCEED CAREFULLY. THE LACK -- DESPITE THE FACT OF THE EC -- OF EUROPEAN COMMON INSTITUTIONS, SPECIFICALLY A EUROPEAN COMMON SPOKESMAN ON POLITICAL MATTERS, WAS AN IMPORTANT LIMITING FACTOR. IN RECENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NINE IT WAS CLEAR THAT FRANCE WAS TAKING A MORE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH THAN THE OTHERS TO THE DIALOGUE. BUT THE GERMANS AND OTHERS WOULD WORK IN COPENHAGEN FOR AS GOOD RESULTS AS POSSIBLE, AND A SERIOUS EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON SECURITY AND POLITICAL ISSUES. SCHEEL SAID HE WAS NOT CLEAR ON HOW TO MOVE PROCEDURALLY ON CONTACTING THE US ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS FOR THE DIALOGUE. BILATERAL CONTACTS WERE POSSIBLE, OR PERHAPS THE NINE COULD AUTHORIZE A SINGLE SPOKESMAN.

3. SCHEEL SAID THE FRENCH WERE CONCERNED -- UNJUSTIFIABLY, IN HIS OPINION -- THAT THE US INFLUENCE ON EUROPE WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY STRONG. FOR THIS REASON THE FRENCH WOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANY STEPS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE DIALOGUE. FRANCE WAS AFRAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT MIGHT BE THE BEGINNING OF A STRUCTURE IN WHICH THE US WOULD TALK WITH EUROPE ABOUT EUROPEAN PROBLEMS, BUT EUROPE WOULD HAVE VERY LITTLE REVERSE INFLUENCE ON WHAT GOES ON IN THE US. SCHEEL SAID HE HAD MADE HIS OWN VIEWS CLEAR, NOTABLY IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH

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LE MONDE. THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY WITHOUT THE US. SOME PEOPLE HAD CRITICIZED HIM ALLEGEDLY FOR SHOWING A LACK OF FAITH IN EUROPE'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT UNTIL EUROPE HAD DEVELOPED A CENTRAL POLITICAL WILL THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN TALKING ABOUT EUROPEAN INDEPENDENCE IN SECURITY MATTERS, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE.

4. SCHEEL SAID THAT FRENCH HESITANCY DID NOT MEAN THAT US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION HAD TO SUFFER, OR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD POLITICAL DEFINITION OF THE ALLIANCE. THE FRG HAD PUT FORWARD ITS IDEAS FOR A DECLARATION. OTHERS HAD BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS, LESS PRECISE, BUT HE SAW POSSIBILITIES OF MAKING REAL PROGRESS. ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HAVE A JOINT MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE EC COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES.

5. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION AS TO SCHEEL'S VIEW OF FRG-FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CHIRAC INTERVIEW, SCHEEL WAS AT PAINS TO STRESS THE POSITIVE. HE SAW NO CONCRETE REASON FOR SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH FRANCE, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ON VARIOUS ISSUES. CLEARLY THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO GO FASTER THAN FRANCE TOWARD A UNITED EUROPE. THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, FROM WHICH FRANCE GAINED AND GERMANY LOST VERY HEAVILY. SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WERE HISTORICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL IN NATURE. THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF NATIONAL PATRIOTISM WAS DISTINCTIVE AND PRONOUNCED, SO MUCH SO THAT THE FRENCH HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FRG PREFERRED ITS FREEDOM TO THE RECOVERY OF GERMAN NATIONAL UNITY AT THE PRICE OF NEUTRALIZATION. THE FRENCH WERE UNSURE OF THEMSELVES. THEY HAD MADE ENORMOUS OUTLAYS OF RESOURCES ON PROJECTS WHICH HAD NOT PAID OFF INTERNATIONALLY -- NUCLEAR ENERGY, COLOR TV, CONCORDE, THE FORCE DE FRAPPE. SCHEEL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE CHIRAC INTERVIEW FULLY REFLECTED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S OR POMPIDOU'S VIEWS. PERSONAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS CLEARLY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR CHIRAC.

6. SCHEEL CONCLUDED ON THE SAME UPBEAT NOTE HE HAD MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. HE THOUGHT THE FRENCH WOULD BE PREPARED

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TO GO FASTER ON EUROPEAN UNITY IN THE FUTURE. HE HOPED THE POMPIDOU PRESS CONFERENCE IN SEPTEMBER WOULD, AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED, GIVE SOME EVIDENCE OF THIS.

HILLENBRAND

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